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I'VE GOT A BEEF WITH You: THE INCREASED LIABILITY
OF ANIMAL PRODUCERS IN KENTUCKY AFTER THE
REPUDIATION OF THE IMPACT RULE
Zachary F. Mattioni"
INTRODUCTION
A large-scale hog processing facility has legally operated in
Louisville, Kentucky, for forty-three years The plant employs 1,300
workers and is a major foundation of the city's economy, surpassed only by
the Ford Motor Company and General Electric.2 But there is a problem.
Processing about 10,000 pigs a day into the products that are enjoyed
across the nation is not a clean or pleasant operation An odor, which is
described by some as "piercing," "definitive," and "extremely offensive,"
emits from the facility during its operation.' The unpleasant smell is
persistent, unavoidable, and detectable up to a half mile from the plant.'
While many inhabitants of the surrounding area are actually not
significantly bothered by the odor, some individuals find it to be
intolerable. 6 Suppose members of this unhappy contingent secure counsel
and subsequently are all examined by the same "sympathetic" doctors.
These medical professionals might be quick to attribute a variety of
unobservable ailments (i.e. migraines, nausea, and dizziness) to the smell
the plant produces.
Suddenly, a flood of negligent infliction of emotional distress suits
targeting the hog-processing plant are filed. These claims ultimately
become a stagnant battle between experts and healthcare professionals.
* Production Editor, KY.J. EQUINE, AGRiC. &NAT. RESOURCES L., 2015-2016; B.S. 2013,
University of South Carolina; J.D. expected May 2016, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'Lauren Etter, Trendy District Roasts Hog Plant, THE WALL ST.J. (Nov. 16,2009, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/artides/SB125832156249749411.
2Id.
3Id.
4James Bruggers, Slaughterhouse Odor Police Rely on their Noses, THE COURIERJ. (Nov. 4, 2014,
12:08 PM), http://www.courier-journal.con/story/tech/science/environment/2014/11/03/bs-
slaugherhouse-odors/18435581/.
5 Id.
6 id.
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Meritorious suits and specious, but difficult to disprove, cases form a
cacophony of litigation that clogs the court's dockets. Meanwhile, the
embattled company that owns the facility debates whether to move the
operations somewhere else entirely. While this unpleasant scenario is at
present only hypothetical, it is a very real possibility under the current legal
rules in Kentucky.
As an increasing population's demand for agricultural products shrinks
the divide between commercial and residential zones, inevitable conflicts
arise between individuals and corporations. In order to ensure that the
Commonwealth remains an attractive market for industries, the threat of
excessive or spurious litigation must be restricted. Until very recently, the
agricultural industry in the state of Kentucky had been well-insulated from
tort liability.7 However, changes to the traditional rules of recovery have
greatly broadened the category of those who may seek damages for
emotional distress; as a result, a wide range of companies are now faced
with the threat of an inordinate amount of potential litigation! To
eliminate this looming threat and safeguard the economic viability of the
Commonwealth, the Kentucky Legislature should adopt measures to
ensure that only meritorious claims may be brought.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the rule in Kentucky was
that, in negligence cases, there could be no recovery for "fright, shock, or
mental anguish that was unaccompanied by physical contact or injury."9
The "impact rule," though it was the majority view in the United States for
quite some time, eventually fell out of favor in all but a small number of
jurisdictions.10 Kentucky was a committed member of this minority until
2012 when, in Osborne v. Keeney, the Kentucky Supreme Court repudiated
the impact rule and adopted the majority approach of evaluating emotional
distress claims under general negligence principles." For the first time in
state history, a plaintiff was able to bring suit for negligent infliction of
emotional distress caused by sources which would reasonably cause severe
mental distress, but otherwise may not have a physical effect.
The demise of the impact rule has major ramifications for the
agricultural industry of the Commonwealth. Prior to Osborne, suits for
emotional distress caused by intangible sources, such as odors or noise,
would be dismissed because they failed to physically impact the plaintiff.12
' See Reed v. Ford, 122 S.W. 600,601 (Ky. 1908).
' See Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Ky. 2012).
9 Reed, 112 S.W. at 601.
"Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 14.
"Id. at 17.
12 See Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272,275 (1929).
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A nuisance action could potentially be brought, but "only if' the defendant
caused an unreasonable and substantial annoyance." Furthermore, one
could only recover for the loss in fair market value of property, not for
annoyance, discomfort, sickness, or emotional distress.4 As a result,
agricultural corporations enjoyed a distinct legal protection that has now
evaporated with the ruling in Osborne.
Slaughterhouses and animal processing plants are most immediately at
risk from the termination of the impact rule. It should be noted that animal
products are a major source of income for the Commonwealth."5 Poultry is
the most valuable agricultural commodity in Kentucky, with cattle and
swine ranking fifth and tenth, respectively.16 However, industrial farm
animal production directly contributes to poor air quality in the
surrounding area through the release of "significant quantities of toxic
gases and odorous substances, as well as particulates and bioaerosols
containing a variety of microorganisms and human pathogens."7 Clearly,
exposure to such noxious emissions could cause "severe emotional distress."
As a result, animal production companies are particularly susceptible to
voluminous litigation in the future.
As this note will discuss, the recent decision in Powell v. Tosb confirms
the vulnerability of animal production companies."8 In Powell, the court
held that emotional distress claims stemming from the odor caused by
defendants' hog farming operations would be actionable, contingent upon
medical proof.'9 Powell convincingly demonstrates that in a post-Osborne
legal system, expert testimony will ultimately be the most important factor
in determining recovery. The conclusions reached in Powell, combined
with the case law of other jurisdictions that repudiated the impact rule,
further illustrate that animal production companies now face major risks.
This note will not argue for a return to the impact rule standard, but
rather seek to encourage the Kentucky Legislature to adopt the changes
necessary to protect animal production companies under the current law.
Part II will discuss the impact rule and why it is irreparably flawed. Part III
will examine the reasoning of the Osborne court, the changes it
11 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.530 (West 2015).
14 Id. § 411.560.
is Kentucky Economy, NETSTATE.COM, http://www.netstate.com/economy/kyeconomy.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
16 KentuckyAgriculture Facts, KY. FARM BUREAU, https://www.kyfb.com/media/files/fed/home-
page/2013/CommodityBooklet.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
17 ROLF U. HALDEN & KELLOGJ. SCHWAB, EnvironmentalImpact ofIndustrial Farm Animal
Production, PEW COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD. (2006),
http://www.ncifap.org/_images/212-4-Envlmpacttc Final.pdf.
1" See Powell v. Tosh, No. 5:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2013 WL 1878934 (W.D. Ky. May 3, 2013).
19 Id. at *5.
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implemented, and the ultimate effect of its decision. Part IV will illustrate
how animal producers in particular face significant vulnerability with an
analysis of Powell v. Tosh. Finally, Part V will suggest two solutions that
can help remedy the issues with the current system. First, a "certificate of
merit," similar to that used in medical malpractice cases of other
jurisdictions, should be adopted to help ensure that only objective,
reputable experts are able to be retained by plaintiffs for these suits.2 °
Additionally, a liability exemption that weighs criteria similar to those of
KRS 411.550 should be used sparingly in order to ensure fairness and
protect the most economically important companies.21
I. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE IMPACT RULE
A. Origin of the Impact Rule
In the United States, the impact rule dates back to the late 1 9' century
and was derived from the English case of Victorian Railways Commissioners
v. Coultas,22 where the House of Lords concluded that an emotional
disturbance unaccompanied by an actual, physical injury would overextend
the liability of future defendants and open the courts to a barrage of false
claims.23 American courts shared similar concerns and favored this easily
applicable and seemingly practical approach, for a time at least.24 The
Court of Appeals of New York in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., denied
recovery to a plaintiff who suffered a miscarriage and illness, but no
physical injury, from nearly being struck by the defendant's horse-drawn
car.2" The court held:
The difficulty which often exists in cases of alleged physical
injury, in determining whether they exist, and, if so,
whether they were caused by the negligent act of the
defendant, would not only be greatly increased, but a wide
field would be opened for fictitious or speculative claims.
See Culver v. Specter, No. 1:CV-11-2205, 2014 WL 4717836, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22,2014).
21 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.550 (West 2015).
22 Pieters v. B-Right Trucking, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
23 BARRYA. LINDHAL,4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITYAND LITIGATION § 32:15 (2d ed.)
(citing Victorian Rys. Com'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888)).24 
id.
21 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896) overruledby Battalla v. State, 176
N.E.2d 729 (1961).
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To establish such a doctrine would be contrary to
principles of public policy.
26
The Massachusetts Supreme Court similarly embraced the impact rule,
as the wide range of different factual circumstances and the inherent
subjectivity of emotional injuries led to the conclusion that, "it is
impossible satisfactorily to administer any other rule."27 In light of these
jurisprudential concerns and the scientific limits of the time, which
prevented a truly informed examination of a plaintiffs condition, the
impact rule appeared to be a useful legal standard worthy of widespread
use.
Concerns about fraudulent claims of emotional distress guided the
Kentucky courts' adoption of the impact rule and its long-time adherence
to this standard.2" An abundance of case law holds that damages for
emotional distress unaccompanied by a physical injury "are too remote and
speculative, are easily simulated and difficult to disprove, and there is no
standard by which they can be justly measured."29 Additionally, until
Osborne, the Supreme Court of Kentucky expressed great apprehension
that a shift away from the traditional impact rule principles would lead to a
"flood of new litigation."0 These two reasons, essentially the identical
rationale of the Mitchell court, were apparently so compelling that they led
to a strict adherence to impact rule for over one hundred years after its
adoption in the state.31
B. Failings of the Impact Rule
The impact rule was the subject of severe and widespread criticism
almost from its inception.32 For a doctrine whose supposed benefits were
practicality and ease of application, the impact rule ultimately provides
neither particularly well. Bizarrely enough, determining what met the
criteria of an "impact" became a frustrating and convoluted endeavor.33
26 id.
27 Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) abrogated by Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380
N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
21 See Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920, 929 (Ky. 2007) abrogated by
Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012); see also Reed v. Ford, 112 S.W. 600,601 (1908).
29 Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r, 163 S.W.2d 21,22 (1942) abrogated by Osborne, 399 S.W.3d 1.
3 Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 15.
3' See Morse v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361,362 (1903) abrogated by
Osborne, 399 S.W.3d 1.
32 Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 14.33BARRYA. LINDHAL, 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITYAND LITIGATION § 32:16 (2d ed.).
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There is considerable judicial leeway in making such a determination.3 4 For
example, smoke inhalation5 , a "jolt" caused by the falling of an elevator36,
and even, ridiculously, particles of dust landing in the plaintiffs eye have all
satisfied what appears to be a token requirement of physical impact.37
Rather than protecting against fraud, the impact rule seemed to function
more as a legal hurdle that could often be overcome through clever
characterization of circumstances.
Furthermore, the concern that abrogation of the impact rule would
bring a flood of fraudulent litigation came to be largely rejected by most
jurisdictions across the country.31 In overruling Mitchell, the New York
Court of Appeals observed that, "[t]he argument from mere expediency
cannot commend itself to a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a
logical legal right and remedy in all cases because in some a fictitious injury
may be urged as a real one."39 Fictitious claims are omnipresent hreats that
are not limited solely to suits for emotional distress.4° The public policy
requirement to provide an appropriate remedy for legitimately injured
plaintiffs outweighs the need to bar fictitious claims.4' The blanket
prohibition given by the impact rule is too broad and judicially unsound.
Advances in medical science and psychiatric evaluation also permit a
more individualized consideration of emotional distress suits that were not
possible when the impact rule was adopted.42 The relatively rudimentary
procedures of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been
replaced by significantly more insightful examination procedures. As a
result, it is much easier to evaluate subjective mental states and calculate
the appropriate amount of compensation that must be paid.3 Similarly,
modern medicine alleviates the difficulty "in tracing the causal connection
between the injuries and the claimed negligent conduct."4 4 The idea that
34 Id.
3' Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (1930), abrogated by Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).
McCardlev. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 177 S.W. 1095, 1096 (1915) abrogated by Bass v.
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983).
37 Porter v. Del., 63 A. 860, 860 (NJ. 1906), abrogated by Ortiz v.John D. Pittenger Builder,
Inc., 889 A.2d 1135 (Super. Ct. 2004).
3 LINDHAL, supra note 33.
3' Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1961) (citing Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 73 A.
688,691 (1909)).
40 LINDHAL, supra note 33.
41 See id.
4' Robb v. Penn. R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709,712 (1965).
41 Orlo v. Conn. Co., 21 A.2d 402,404 (1941).
44Id.
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emotional distress damages lacking an accompanying physical injury are
"too remote and speculative" is simply outdated and inapplicable today.4"
Finally, the most egregious failing of the impact rule is that it produces
decisions repugnant to the public and contradictory to the notion of just
compensation. The oft-cited Tennessee case of Camper v. Minor clearly
illustrates the problem.46 Camper, a cement truck driver, was involved in a
horrific fatal accident when another driver suddenly pulled out in front of
his truck.47 Although Camper received no physical injuries from the
incident, he sought recovery for post-traumatic stress, which resulted from
viewing the other driver's body.4" Camper claimed he "sustained mental
and emotional injuries resulting in loss of sleep, inability to function on a
normal basis, outbursts of crying, and depression[,]" but the court granted
summary judgment for the defendants because the requirements for a
prima facie case of negligent infliction of emotional distress had not been
met.49 The Tennessee Supreme Court, upon subsequent examination,
seized the opportunity to repudiate the impact rule entirely, holding that
"[it] has proved to be inflexible and inadequate in practice; and . . .
completely ignores the fact that some valid emotional injuries simply may
not be accompanied by a contemporaneous physical injury or have physical
consequences.""0 Clearly an approach so arbitrary and underinclusive is
irreconcilable with modern notions ofjustice and jurisprudence.
C. Widespread Repudiation
Tennessee is far from the only jurisdiction to have eliminated the use of
this flawed standard for evaluating emotional distress claims. In fact, the
impact rule never achieved universal adherence in the United States at any
point.51 Texas, for example, explicitly allowed recovery for emotional
distress suffered in the absence of a physical impact.2 National repudiation
of the impact rule was swift as well. The Minnesota and South Carolina
Supreme Courts rejected the impact rule before the end of the nineteenth
century.53 By 1920, a majority of jurisdictions had ceased using this
"See Morgan v. Hightower's Adm'r, 163 S.W.2d 21,22 (1942) abrogated by Osborne v. Keeney,
399 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012).
' Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996).
41 Id. at 439.
4 id.
'9 Id. at 439-40.
'
0 
Id. at 446.
5 1JACOB STEIN, 3 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 10:31 (3d ed.).
52 Hilly. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59, 60 (1890).
13 Purcellv. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 50 N.W. 1034,1035 (1892); Mackv. S.-Bound R. Co., 52
S.C. 323,29 S.E. 905, 909 (1898).
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doctrine.5 4 Even the Restatement of Torts had abandoned the impact rule
by 1934, yet a small minority still adhered to it into the modern era."
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Indiana, Nevada, and Kentucky (until Osborne)
valued the supposed practicality and freedom from fraud that the impact
rule theoretically provides.6 However, widespread and vehement
repudiation by every other jurisdiction reinforces the almost unassailable
conclusion that the impact rule is a fundamentally flawed doctrine that
serves only to frustrate the judicial process.
II. OSBORNE V. KEENEYAND KENTUCKY'S CURRENT APPROACH TO
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
Interestingly enough, Osborne, a case that had such a major impact on
the animal production industry, has absolutely nothing to do with
agriculture at all, further highlighting the far-reaching effects of the
Kentucky Supreme Court's broad holding. The court's decision in Osborne
has opened a Pandora's box of concerns that extends beyond its
expectations.
Osborne, like other difficult negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases, involved an accident where the plaintiff suffered emotional harm, but
no physical injury.57 Brenda Osborne's house was struck by a disabled
plane, which crashed through the second story and set the structure on
fire." Though Osborne was home during the incident, "[n]o debris from
the airplane or the house struck Osborne in any manner, and she suffered
no physical injury as a result of the crash."9 Her doctor, however, testified
that her pre-existing mental conditions were exacerbated by the accident
and that "Osborne was emotionally unstable as a result of the destruction
of her home and her personal belongings."60 She received medical
treatment for her ailments for an extended period of time following the
incident.61
On its face, it appears as though Osborne's claim for emotional distress
cannot be satisfied under the impact rule. The crash failed to touch her at
all, let alone cause any sort of identifiable physical injury. The Court of
Appeals agreed with this line of logic and vacated the damages previously
"4 STEIN, supra note 51, § 10:31.
s5 Id.
56 Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 14 n.39 (Ky. 2012).
Id. at 6.
5 
id.
'9 Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id.
61 Id.
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awarded to Osborne.62 Both the trial court and the Kentucky Supreme
Court characterized the situation differently.63 The "sound waves" emitted
by the crash were, in their view, sufficient to constitute a physical impact.64
Once again, the main failing of the impact rule became apparent. It is
impossible to use the doctrine in a non-arbitrary fashion when the
circumstances are open to interpretation. Here, a claim that by all means
appears legitimate (a real emotional injury supported by evidence from a
medical professional) is barred just as if it was a fraudulent suit. Obviously,
a change in policy had to be made. However, the solution would
unfortunately prove to be imperfect as well.
A. The Reasoning of Osborne
The Osborne court echoed the traditional arguments against the impact
rule in support of their decision to repudiate it. It first noted the historical
criticism of the doctrine, and how the majority of jurisdictions had
abandoned the rule.6" The court then illustrated the unnecessary harshness
and erratic applicability of the impact rule by scrutinizing the holdings of
Deutscb v. Shein and Wilboite v. Cobb.66
An examination of Deutsch and Wilboite demonstrates why the impact
rule is not a viable standard, perhaps even more clearly than Camper. In
Deutscb, the court found one of the single most attenuated physical impacts
in the history of Kentucky law. The plaintiff in the case suffered emotional
distress after terminating her pregnancy because the fetus had
inadvertently been exposed to x-rays.67 The court concluded that being
"bombarded by x-rays" constituted a physical impact.6" In Osborne, the
court correctly noted that, based on Deutscb, any trivial physical touching
can be characterized as an impact in Kentucky.69
Wilhoite demonstrates the other well-recognized failing of the impact
rule at play in Kentucky: The application of the doctrine results in
decisions which are contrary to public policy and notions of fundamental
fairness.7" In Wilboite, the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress when
62 Id. at 8.
63 Id. at 16.
64
1d.
61 Id. at 14.
6 Id. at 15.
67 Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Ky. 1980) abrogated by Osborne, 399 S.W.3d 1.
61 Id. at 146.
69 See Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 15.
70 Wilhoite v. Cobb, 761 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) abrogated by Osborne, 399 S.W.3d
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she witnessed her child being killed by an out of control truck.7' Because
she was not physically impacted during the event, there was no permissible
recovery under Kentucky's draconian interpretation of the impact rule.72
The potential for such distasteful outcomes obviously must be offset by
some strong reasoning in support of the rule. While the Osborne opinion
only acknowledges stare decisis as support for the impact rule73, concerns
about a potential flood of litigation are quickly disregarded because other
jurisdictions that have repudiated the impact rule have not faced such a
problem.74 Of note, however, is the court's focus only on the volume of
suits, rather than their validity, when conducting this analysis.75 A
significant increase in the number of spurious claims specifically is not
discussed with any particularity.
One cannot ignore how the court in Osborne placed enormous
emphasis on the testimony of medical experts in preventing fraud. Like
other jurisdictions, the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that
advances in science and medicine have made the harshness of the impact
rule unnecessary.76 Examinations of intangible, emotional injuries are no
longer entirely speculative, as they were in the late nineteenth century.
77
Fulfilling what it had previously postulated in Steel Technologies, Inc. v.
Congleton, the court abrogated the impact rule, believing that the truth-
finding function is best served by scrutinizing medical expert and
eyewitness testimony.7 This assessment is beyond reproach. As previously
discussed, the impact rule can be surmounted in many cases by a cleverly
plead claim. However, the deference given to medical experts should not be
ignored. A "sympathetic" expert may be almost as easy to produce as a
trivial impact.
B. The Ultimate Effect of Osborne
In spite of the difficulties posed by elimination of the impact rule, the
Kentucky Supreme Court was quick to employ a different standard in
Osborne. The court determined that emotional distress claims would be
71 id.
72 id.
7' Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 16.741 d. at 18.
I d. (citing Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (using similar analysis)).
76 Id. at 16.
7' Id.; see Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920, 930 (Ky. 2007) abrogated by
Osborne, 399 S.W.3d 1.
" Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 16.
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evaluated under "general negligence principles."79 The requirement,
therefore, is "[t]he plaintiff must present evidence of the recognized
elements of a common law negligence claim: (1) the defendant owed a duty
of care to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury to the plaintiff,
and (4) legal causation between the defendant's breach and the plaintiffs
injury."8 0 Essentially, the main effect is that the hurdle of the impact rule
has simply been removed. What remains are just the ordinary elements of a
negligence case. The reasoning behind this approach is that the "proper
application of the familiar elements of negligence is the preferable way in
which to sort out the genuine from the false, the serious from the trivial.""1
The idea is addition by subtraction; by eliminating the impact rule and its
inherent arbitrariness, clearer, more accurate decisions will be reached.
This aspect of the policy is just fairly standard procedure.
The interesting aspect of this new doctrine is the safeguard employed
to address the issue of dishonest claims. The court explicitly acknowledges
that without some form of added protection there is a risk of fraudulent
claims.8 2 This same logic is part of the reason why the impact rule endured
for so long." To replace it, the court adopted Tennessee's requirement hat
the emotional injury suffered must be "severe" or "serious."4 The
definition of such harm is fairly ambiguous and loose: "A 'serious' or
(severe' emotional injury occurs where a reasonable person, normally
constituted, would not be expected to endure the mental stress engendered
by the circumstances of the case. Distress that does not significantly affect
the plaintiffs [sic] everyday life or require significant treatment will not
suffice."" In addition to suffering a serious emotional injury, a plaintiff
"must present expert medical or scientific proof to support the claimed
injury or impairment." 6 This means that not only is the testimony of a
medical expert weighted heavily in the evaluation of a claim, it is necessary
in order to proceed with a suit at all.
The effect of Osborne is two-fold. First, circumstances that in no way
could be described as physically contacting a plaintiff are now actionable.
Bright light, foul smells, or disturbing visuals, all of which would have
failed under the impact rule, are now permissible and valid grievances.
79 Id. at 17.
o Id. (citing Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88-89 (Ky. 2003)).
s1 Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437,443 (Tenn. 1996) (internal citations omitted). Tennessee
uses an identical approach to emotional distress claims.
52 Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 17.
83 See Congleton, 234 S.W.3d at 929-30.
s Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 17; see also Camper, 915 S.W.2d 437, 443 (Tenn. 1996).
ss Osborne, 399 S.W.3d at 17.
6Id. at 18.
2015-2016]
174 KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 8 No. 1
Second, and more importantly, experts will determine whether a negligent
infliction of emotional distress case lives or dies. One cannot overstate how
much power has been ceded to testifying experts. The impact rule, as
ineffective and arbitrary as it may have been, attempted to implement a
concrete, objective procedure for weeding out fraudulent claims. Now, the
only significant bar to bringing an action is acquiring favorable medical or
scientific testimony. The ability to abuse this process warrants serious
apprehension and consideration of new safeguards.
III. THE IMMINENT RISKTO ANIMAL PRODUCERS AS SHOWN BY
POWELL V. TOSH
Based solely on Osborne, the threat to animal production companies is
only abstract. Clearly, they are often responsible for intangible impacts,
especially in the form of foul odors.7 However, the issue of whether such
claims would be actionable is not explicitly resolved. Powell bridges the gap
between the holding of Osborne and the new liability faced by animal
processing companies. The decision clearly illustrates the distinct,
significant vulnerability of the agriculture sector under the general
negligence principles doctrine.
In what seems to be increasingly commonplace88 , the issue in Powell
centered on the offensive smells that the facilities processing a population
of animals emitted.8 9 The plaintiffs in the case were a group of homeowners
whose property was located within a one-mile radius of the defendant's
swine barns.9" The defendants included not only the operators of the barns,
but also "several affiliated companies that are engaged in commercial swine
farming in both Kentucky and Tennessee."9 1 As a result of the "recurring
intolerable noxious odors" continually produced by the hog farming
operation, the plaintiffs asserted a spectrum of claims, including
"temporary nuisance, permanent nuisance, trespass, negligence, negligence
per se, product liability, battery, and civil conspiracy."92 While their
negligence claim for emotional harm was ultimately disallowed, the court's
reasoning leaves the door open for similar suits in the future.9"
"7 See, e.g., Suzi Parker, How Poultry Producers are Ravaging the Rural South, GRIST (Feb. 22,
2006), http://grist.org/artidce/parker1/.
ss See id.
"Powell v. Tosh, 929 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697 (W.D. Ky. 2013) opinion vacated inpart on
reconsideration, No. 5:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2013 WL 1878934 (W.D. Ky. May 3,2013).
9Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 698-99.
9' Id. at 710.
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A. The Mistake of the Powell Claimants
Immediately, it should be noted that none of the plaintiffs in this case
suffered anything that can be described as a physical impact. All of the
plaintiffs' harm was the result of an intangible, invisible odor.9 4
Furthermore, only one of the claimants acknowledged experiencing
physical symptoms of any kind.9" While even the most lenient
interpretation of the impact rule would have barred the claim, under the
general negligence principles approach the suit was permissible thus far.
The case eventually stalled, however, because the requirement for
"severe" or "serious" emotional harm was not sufficiently proven." Though
the plaintiffs alleged suffering emotional distress, they never sought any
sort of treatment for their injuries.97 More importantly, they failed to
present any expert medical or scientific proof to confirm their accusations,
as is mandatory under Osborne.9" Summary judgment was therefore
appropriate in the eyes of the court because the genuineness of the harm
had not been concretely established.99
At first blush, the failure to supply the requisite expert testimony in
order to establish emotional harm appears to be either a glaring oversight
on the part of the plaintiffs' attorneys, or a sign that the claim was actually
disingenuous and therefore correctly decided in favor of the defendants.
However, the actual answer is much simpler. The Osborne standard did not
exist at the time of the plaintiffs' injuries.10 0 The operations that caused the
offending odor began in 2007 and the complaint was filed in 2009.0
Osborne was not decided for another three years.0 2 Nevertheless, the Powell
court chose to apply the Osborne rules retroactively and denied the
plaintiffs' pleas for additional time to meet the new requirements.3 It
reasoned that seeking treatment upon learning that it was necessary for
such a suit "would fly against Osborne's stated objective of vetting the
genuineness of alleged emotional distress injuries."' 4 For the Powell
94 See id. at 698.9 Id. at 709.
96id.
97id.
98 Id.
"Id.
"oo See id. at 698.
101 Id.
102 Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012).
103 Powell v. Tosh, No. 5:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2013 WL 1878934, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 3,
2013).
" oId.
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claimants, it was simply a case of too little, too late; however, future
plaintiffs are certain to learn from their mistakes.
B. Life After Powell
In the immediate aftermath of Osborne, several other emotional distress
claims in Kentucky failed because the plaintiffs did not produce the
necessary expert medical or scientific proof.10 5 The courts proceeded to
make the rule absolutely clear: "In Kentucky, plaintiffs seeking damages
for emotional distress must adduce expert testimony in support of their
claim."0 6 In the future, it is virtually certain that medical experts will be
retained to support emotional distress actions and prospective plaintiffs
will undergo some sort of treatment in order to give their cases the
necessary corroboration. Failure to retain such experts would be an
egregious oversight on the part of the counsel, bordering on malpractice.
10 7
The stated purpose of vetting claims works well when plaintiffs are
unaware of the Osborne requirements. On its face, it is reasonable to
assume that someone suffering from a significant emotional disturbance
would seek medical or psychological treatment. Ignoring the wide variety
of behaviors and coping mechanisms that the emotionally distressed
exhibit, the court's logic fails when it becomes widely known that such a
course is required to bring suit. Both the truly harmed and the malingerers
are certain to behave in the same way. Once again, the truth may be
obfuscated, just as under the impact rule.
Hypothetically, had the Powell plaintiffs met the burden of proof in
showing a "severe" or "serious" emotional injury, it appears likely that their
claim would have been actionable. The court echoes the Osborne
characterization of severe emotional distress as resulting from harm "that
significantly affects the plaintiffs life or requires significant treatment. "108
The former is especially perturbing because of the abundance of situations
that could be described as significantly affecting a plaintiff's life. The
Powell claimants testified "that they no longer host friends and family
members at their homes, their children are unable to play outside as
frequently, they do not use their homes' swimming pools or patios, and
10' Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013);
Sergent v. ICG Knott Cnty., LLC, No. CIV. 12-118-ART, 2013 WL 6451210 at *8 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9,
2013).
1' Se-gent, No. CIV. 12-118-ART, 2013 WL 6451210, at *8.
107 Ky Sup. CT. R. 3.130.
10 Powell, No. 5:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2013 WL 1878934, at *4.
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they are unable to open their windows" as result of the odor.1"9 It is beyond
dispute that such conditions could significantly affect their lives. Similar
complaints are often made about other animal processing plants both
nationally and in Kentucky.'" The inescapable conclusion is that more
suits like Powell are inevitable.
IV. WHERE WE STAND TODAY: CURRENT CONSEQUENCES AND
FUTURE SOLUTIONS
There is no doubt that there was great enthusiasm to get rid of the
impact rule in Kentucky."' It had proven to be an unworkable, exploitable
doctrine that was the product of a less sophisticated time. It cannot be
argued that the decision to repudiate it was unwise and judicially unsound.
But, in focusing so heavily on the failings of the impact rule, the Osborne
court overlooked the potential problems that the use of general negligence
principles will pose. Powell serves as the first example of the broad liability
that animal production companies now face. The case also demonstrates
that individuals asserting fictitious claims can still satisfy the preconditions
necessary to bring an action. The end result is that the agriculture industry
now bears an unequal risk under the new rules and faces legitimate
impairments.
A. Examining the Direct Consequences on Animal Producers
Animal production companies are vital to the economy of Kentucky.
As of 2014, poultry is a $1.2 billion industry that employs 6,300 industry
employees with "egg producers contributing approximately $214.7 million"
to the state's economy per year."' There are 38,000 beef cattle producers in
Kentucky, and cash receipts for the sale of these animals totaled over
$656.7 million in 2012, accounting for 12.4% of the total cash receipts that
109 Poweliv. Tosh, 929 F. Supp. 2d 691,698 (W.D. Ky. 2013) opinion vacated in part on
reconsideration, No. 5:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2013 VVL 1878934 (W.D. Ky. May 3,2013).
"' See S Heather Duncan, Class-Action SuitAgainst Rendering Plant Nearly Settled, THE
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.macon.com/2010/04/30/1112190/dass-action-suit-against-
rendering.html; Odor Complaint Persists at Howard Plant, CHANNEL 3000 (May 28, 2013,10:31 AM),
http://www.channel3000.com/news/politics/odor-complaints-persist-at-howard-plant/20326742;
Etter, supra note 1.
. Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 14-15 (Ky. 2012).
12 Kentucky Poultry Industry Facts, KY. POULTRY FED'N, http://www.kypoultry.org/pfacts/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015).
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year.113 Dairy cow production resulted in another $214.6 million.' 4 Swine,
though the smallest of the three, still accounted for $115.4 million and
2.2% of total cash receipts."1 Anything that disrupts the ability of the
industry to function normally poses severe economic consequences for the
Commonwealth. A flood of emotional distress litigation has the potential
to harm not just corporations, but the state of Kentucky as a whole.
The wide reach of now-permissible emotional distress suits also raises
the specter of costly litigation for all groups involved in animal production.
Powell shows that not only will the animal producers that caused the
alleged injury be potentially liable, but also the companies that rely upon
them."6 The "Tosh Defendants" (Tosh Farms General Partnership and its
affiliates) denied an agency relationship with the individuals raising their
hogs and asserted that the farmers were independent contractors whose
affiliation was "akin to a bailment.""7 The court, however, found that
vicarious liability was appropriate.' Because the Tosh Defendants
provided supplies, paid yearly instead of by the job, and, most importantly,
"exercise[d] a great deal of control over crucial aspects of the hog-raising
operation," they were responsible for the actions of the farmers.
19
The Tosh Defendants' experience is not likely an isolated one. Other
corporations who follow similar business models that involve close
regulation of their animal producers will also be subject to vicarious
liability. For example, Tyson Foods, Inc. employs contract chicken growers
across the United States, including Kentucky.2 ° Tyson supplies these
individuals with chickens, "scientifically formulated feed," veterinary aid,
and technical advice, "while the poultry producer provides the labor,
housing, and utilities." 2' The company dearly exhibits significant control
over the grower's operations by sending technical advisors on a weekly
basis22 and strictly requiring facility improvements.123 Consequently, if one
13 Kentucky Agriculture Facts, KY. FARM BuREAU,
https://www.kyfb.com/media/files/fed/home-page/2013/CommodityBooklet.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2015).
1
,1Id.
115 Id.
116 Powell v. Tosh, 929 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701-02 (W.D. Ky. 2013) opinion vacated in part on
reconsideration, No. 5:09-CV-00121-TBR, 2013 WL 1878934 (W.D. Ky. May 3,2013).
"
7 
Id. at 697-98, 700-01.
I1 d. at 702.
1Id. at 701.
120 See How to Become a Contract Grower, TYSON, http://www.growwithtyson.com/how-to-
become-a-contract-grower/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
121 Overview of Contract Poultry Farming, TYSON, htp://www.growwithtyson.com/overview-of-
contract-poultry-fanning/ (last visitedJan. 21, 2015).
122 id.
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of its producers was sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
Tyson would likely be liable as well. Rather than deal with the financial
burden and headache of being dragged into multiple lawsuits, the company
might use its considerable assets to move its operations to a more favorable
jurisdiction entirely. Other similarly situated corporations would likely
follow suit.
Unlike large companies who can leverage their considerable assets to
fight suits or use their existing infrastructure to find a new location for
operations, smaller farmers and independent producers do not have the
ability to escape these unfavorable circumstances. It is not feasible for
ordinary producers to drastically alter their businesses in order to reduce
the risk of being continually involved in litigation. Considering the
opportunity for potentially unlimited damages verdicts, ordinary producers
may be incapable of continuing their operations. Prior to Osborne, these
individuals primarily would have had to be concerned with nuisance claims.
Damages awarded for a private nuisance are "measured by the reduction in
the fair market value of the claimant's property caused by the nuisance, but
not to exceed the fair market value of the property."'24 No drop in property
value would mean no overall liability and, if a loss were to have occurred,
the money owed would be easily calculable. Negligent infliction of
emotional distress is subject to normal tort damages rules and is awarded in
amounts determined by a jury.125 Such verdicts are of course variable and
difficult to anticipate126, but can also be substantial. Juries may view
plaintiffs as innocent victims of careless animal producers and subsequently
award high damages.12 7 The resulting cost may be too much to bear, which
may ultimately cause Kentucky as a whole to suffer the negative effects.
B. Solutions
Noticeably, we've reached an impasse. The impact rule is so
fundamentally impaired that returning to it would be harmful and illogical.
The doctrine of general negligence principles, though subject to misuse, is
the superior option. Unfortunately, there are no modifications that can be
applied to sweep away all frivolous and/or fraudulent claims. The best
option is for the Kentucky Legislature to implement two procedural
123 The Crutchfields: Life Under Contract, FARM AID,
http://www.farmaid.org/site/apps/nlnet/csntent2.aspx?c=qll5IhNVJsE&b=2723875&ct=13135015
(last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
124 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.560 (West 2015).
125 Id. § 411.182.
.26 Valerie P. Hans, Whats It Wortbjury DamageAwards as Community Judgments, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 935,966-68 (2014).
127 See id. at 944.
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safeguards designed to help ensure that only meritorious suits are brought.
A mandatory certificate of merit for emotional distress claims and a limit
on the liability of certain animal producers will bring much-needed balance
to this difficult situation.
1. Certificate ofMerit
Certificates of merit are used for medical malpractice cases in various
jurisdictions12', but may also be employed for professional malpractice,
product liability, and certain sexual abuse suits.129 They serve as a written
attestation by a medical professional as to the plaintiffs injuries.3 ° with the
overall goal being to reduce frivolous claims.'31 Typically, the plaintiff is
required to file an expert affidavit with the complaint that states that the
case has been reviewed by a health professional "who[m they] reasonably
believe is knowledgeable in relevant issues.., and is qualified in the subject
of the case.'32 The health professional must also provide a written report in
which they have determined that the cause of action is meritorious.'33 The
result is an added safeguard against meritless civil suits and a protection for
defendants against unfair harm.
Though Kentucky does not currently use certificates of merit, the
Kentucky Legislature would be well-advised to adopt them for use in
emotional distress claims of this kind. First, their use would be consistent
with the Osborne requirement of expert medical testimony. The Kentucky
Supreme Court was still concerned with the possibility of malingerers in
the post-impact rule system and saw expert scientific or medical proof as a
way to use modern societal advancements to vet suits.'34 A certificate of
merit fits neatly as a supplementary step that adds extra scrutiny to the
existing process without making any dramatic changes to the court's
design.
The use of a certificate of merit would also promote the Osborne court's
goal of limiting recovery to only cases of severe emotional distress.'5 The
medical professional that reviews the claim and provides a written report on
128 See Culverv. Specter, No. 1:CV-11-2205, 2014 WL 4717836, at '2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22,
2014).
129 Jefferey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates
of Merit?, B.Y.U. L. Rev. 537,539 (1997).
'3 Culver, No. 1:CV-11-2205, 2014 WL 4717836, at *2.
131 Parness & Leonetti, supra note 129, at 541.
132 Id. at 556.
133 Id.
134 Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Ky. 2012).
131 Id. at 17.
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the merits of the case will corroborate the seriousness of the injury suffered.
Unfortunately, there still exists the risk of "sympathetic" experts framing
the facts in a way that is favorable to the plaintiffs, but this added hurdle
makes dishonesty even more difficult.
Finally, the use of certificates of merit would help to increase animal
production companies' confidence in the Kentucky judicial system.
Requiring additional scrutiny demonstrates that the courts are actively
trying to stamp out frivolous suits and have acknowledged the risks faced
by animal producers. The burden placed on a plaintiff in obtaining a
certificate of merit is relatively small and the potential assistance to a future
defendant is great. From a cost/benefit perspective alone, a certificate of
merit requirement is warranted.
2. Limiting Liability
Certain exceptions to the general rule of recovery for emotional distress
suits should be made for the most important animal producers. The
protected individuals would have to meet several criteria that demonstrate
their value and usefulness. KRS 411.550(1) weighs several factors to
determine whether a defendant's use of property constitutes a private
nuisance and would provide a useful test for this if it were slightly modified
for emotional distress claims.'36 The court would examine:
a. The lawful nature of the defendant's use of the
property;
b. The manner in which the defendant has used the
property;
c. The importance of the defendant's use of the property
to the community;
d. The influence of the defendant's use of property to the
growth and prosperity of the community;
e. The kind, volume, and duration of the emotional
distress caused by the defendant's use of property;
f. The respective situations of the defendant and
claimant; and
g. The character of the area in which the defendant's
property is located, including, but not limited to, all
applicable statutes, laws, or regulations.'37
"3 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.550 (West 2015).
1
37 Id. Note that "e." has been modified to reflect its application to emotional distress claims.
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This test would be applied stringently and only in the most extreme
situations. It would ensure that Kentucky's most essential animal producers
are able to continue their affairs without the fear of constant litigation,
while also reinforcing confidence in the viability of the animal producer's
operations within the state. The test's flexibility also allows the court to
deny use of the exemption if they determine that the plaintiffs injury
outweighs whatever value the animal producer provides. The liability
exception is the natural complement to the certificate of merit. The latter
provides increased scrutiny in all suits, while the former accounts for
extraordinary circumstances. Together, they help to alleviate the most
serious problems with the general negligence principles doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
From its inception, the impact rule was a convoluted, arbitrary metric
that succeeded only in denying recovery for some of those who were most
in need. The Kentucky Supreme Court correctly decided that a new system
was needed. Osborne stands as an incredibly important decision that,
despite accomplishing much good, unfortunately left animal production
companies vulnerable to a flood of litigation. Prospective plaintiffs will
learn from the mistakes of the Powell claimants and the resulting suits will
pose a major economic risk to the state of Kentucky. Therefore, procedural
protections for the animal producers are absolutely necessary for both
judicial fairness and financial growth. By enacting these changes, the
Kentucky Legislature can ensure that some of its most important industries
have a productive future.
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